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Book Reviews
Tux CmimiNAL LAw REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTTrm -:1969-1971. By
the Editors of The Criminal Law Reporter. Washington: The
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1972. Pp. 335. $10.00.
The Editors have provided the scholarly community and practictioners of the law with an excellent reference work. Indeed, even
the jacket describes accurately the book's contents. "This book provides a Term-by-Term, case-by-case review of the Supreme Court
in the area of criminal law since Mapp v. Ohio." For those who have
racked their brains looking for a stray citation, a forgotten date, the
correct chronology of cases, or which Justice said that catchy little
phrase or made that abominable admission, this book will more than
pay for its purchase price by saving many trips to the library or piles
of those photostats stashed away somewhere in a file drawer, attic or
basement.
The title is somewhat modest, for the book scans an enormous
range material. There are cases decided by the Court, literally from
"Abortion'"to "Witnesses," including such staples as the major decisions
on the First Amendment, guilty pleas, interrogation and confessions,
military and selective service, confrontation, right to counsel, search
and seizure and self-incrimination. Not only do the editors proceed
from year to year and provide the standard table of cases, but an
additional excellent reference aid, a table cases arranged by subject
classification, also is included.
Two minor organizational criticisms may be noted. First; the table
of cases and cases arranged by subject classification frequently do not
include cases mentioned in the course of the volume which were not
decided during the 1960-1971 terms of Court. Thus, one must scan
the book to find which case decided between 1960-1971 overruled
prior cases. For example, while the editors note during their discussion
of Mapp that Wolf was overruled, Wolf is not listed in either index.
Second, for some reason the cases do not proceed as they were decided.
While it is understandable and convenient that the editors divided
the cases by subject matter for each term of Court, there seems to be
no reason why the cases should not follow in perfect chronological
order. Why, for example, should Escobedo precede MassiahP Although
the editors' presentation may make more sense to them and their
readers alike, such methodology serves to distort the actual historical
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picture and brings a certain logical development to the cases which in
fact may be absent.
The editors fulfill another promise, one which I was particularly
pessimistic about: "Each case is concisely analyzed and attention is
drawn to earlier cases now overruled or distinguished and to the views
of dissenting Justices."' The editors have no ideological axe to grind.
Each analysis is done fairly and concisely-no easy task considering
the topics covered. I could not detect any bias whatsoever, only the
constant attempt to understand the views of the Justices and the
general trend of the Court's decisions. The crucial points in majority
and often minority opinions are presented, with the editors always
alert to clarify differences between the views of the Justices. They
also have a discerning eye for telling arguments, regardless of whether
they stem from majority or minority points of view. The introduction,
clear and arranged topically, is helpful, providing the reader with a
quick summary of current law. The editors' interjections throughout
the volume are objective, concise and meaningful.
The book is not, nor does it pretend to be, a substitute for reading
either the actual opinions of the Court or the legal literature. Thus,
the publisher's claim that the work will prove "extremely useful to
...law enforcement officers" is doubtful. 2 First, the case law is too
confusing, even to the Justices, in such areas as confessions and searches
and seizures, and second, the stakes are too high-exclusion of pertinent
evidence, that there appears to be no prudent substitute for reading the
actual opinions or accepting the guidelines issued by official prosecution
sources.
The diversity of subject matter, the multiplicity of opinions, the
shifting of majorities, the exceptions and modifications, make it a book
with which one would not curl up by the fire. The book is, therefore,
primarily a reference work. It is a reference work, however, which
one engaged in Bill of Rights research can justify purchasing for his
personal library, and, without question, it would be a valued addition
to law and university libraries. Moreover, this contribution to the
researcher and student of the Court could be solidified by moderately
priced annuals or biannual updatings, perhaps also including pertinent
bibliographical material.
So concentrated a reading of Court decisions between 1960 and
1971 cannot but help invoke comments of a wider perspective. The
controversey revealed in The Criminal Law Revolution and Its After' Bur. oF
fTH:
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math does not center upon whether the Justices have rewritten the
constitutional protections afforded by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments, for all parties to the controversy accept
that proposition as true. The debate, and it is a continuing one, is
over whether the Court has enhanced or diminished the Constitution
in the process. While in many respects this book is a dream come true,
an opportunity to expand upon an infinite number of topics close to
the reviewer's heart, time and the editor's poised red pencil necessitate
only brief indulgence.
One prominent thread runs throughout this volume and appears
to hold the fabric of the Warren Court's criminal law revolution together, its almost religious subscription to the exclusionary rule. The
Court has defended its utilization primarily on two grounds: 1) as a
means by which an individual's Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights may be effectively safeguarded against police misconduct,
and 2) as ethically necessary if courts are not to sanction police
illegality. As this volume reveals, there was an increasing tendency
for the Warren Court to expand the application of the exclusionary
rule by defining new "illegalities" and coupling them with the poisonous
tree doctrine. The branches and roots of this "tree" have made it, in
recent years, not merely another shrub requiring care in the constitutional garden, but a tree which in its quest for self-preservation
(read effectiveness) and nourishment has proved deadly to old
familiar, and in many ways still logically sound, Wolf, Snyder, Palko
and Twining plantings.3 This tree has not only proved poisonous to
the chain of physical or verbal evidence, but to criminal jurisprudence
itself. The exclusionary rationale is often a substitute for thinking and
the agonizing choices associated with political order and public
policy. The Court has claimed that utilization of the exclusionary rule
preserves its sense of ethics by not sanctioning police illegality; yet,
rarely have we seen the Justices admit ethical responsibility when
justice is not done, when the guilty go free.
The editors trace the haunting consistency of the Warren Court
in their attempt to make the exclusionary rule work, but the idiosyncrasies of individual Justices from time to time restrains this
attempt. Sacrificed at the altar of exclusion has been an essential
ingredient of justice, evidence "relevant, reliable and highly probative
3 Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) and Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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of the issue." 4 Justice, under the Warren Court, has been subjected
to new onslaughts of the "sporting theory,"5 not even redeemed by
any concrete contribution in actually punishing the malicious and/or
corrupt police officers whom the exclusionary rule cannot touch.6
Innocent victims of police misconduct (that is, where no evidence is
found) are offered not one whit of additional protection by the
exclusionary rule. Only where the illegality is fruitful does the rule
come into play. Only the guilty, therefore, obtain a privilege unavailable to the innocent victim of police misconduct-exclusion of pertinent
evidence. In fact, the Warrent Court has made pursuit of those who
7
violate public trust more difficult.
While space does not permit examination of the Court's ideological
posture,8 a review of the cases presented in this volume reveals certain
inconsistencies on the part of the Justices. We see Justice Brennan
assert that "the government's primary responsibility in a criminal case
was to see that justice was done, rather than merely to win the case;" 9
or, the Court quite rightly condemning a prosecutor's deliberate misrepresentation of the truth as denying a fair trial; 10 or, for example,
the remarks of Justice Fortas concurring in Giles v. Maryland:
A criminal trial is not a game in which the State's function is to
outwit and entrap its quarry .... If it has in its exclusive possession

specific, concrete evidence which is not merely cumulative or
embellishing and which may exonerate the defendant or be of
material importance to the defense-regardless of whether it relates to testimony which the State caused to be given at the trialthe State is obliged to bring it to the attention of the court and

the defense."
The evident concern of the Court with the discovery of truth,
hence justice, appears more like an exercise in nostalgia than concern
4CLR, supra note 1, at 39. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(White dissenting). See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) and Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
5 See Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of
Justice, 20 J. Am. Jui. Soc'y 178 (1937).
6 CLR, supra note 1, at 143; Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967).
7CLR, supra note 1, at 106; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. (1967);
v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
Gardner
8
See, e.g., Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PENN.L. REV.
1 (1964); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,53 CALIF.
L. flxv. 929 (1965); Grifllths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or, A Third 'Model
of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
9 CLR, supra note 1, at 5, paraphrasing J. Brennan in Campbell v. United
States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961).
10 Id. at 108; Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
1Id. at 110; Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. (1967).
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rooted in principles subscribed to by the Warren Court. The Court,
on the contrary, had insisted that "there are considerations which
transcend the question of guilt or innocence,"' 2 and the Chief Justice
had put the requirements of this code brutally in Miranda: "the
existence of independent corroborating evidence, produced at trial is,
of course, irrelevant.
...13 Pursuit of truth and the exclusionary
rule, like oil and vinegar, do not mix, a lesson as old as Lisenba and
made abundantly clear in Miranda.14 The Court has made its contribution to making the criminal process a game, and now it expresses
horror when participants play that game spiritedly. Prosecutors are
chastised to seek "justice," while defense attorneys are given free
reign to protect their clients' "interests."
Changes in the Court's personnel make attempted pruning of the
poisonous tree and denial of its exclusionary nourishment a realistic
possibility. 15 As noted by Chief Justice Burger, we pay a "monstrous
price . . . for the exclusionary rule in which we seem to have im-

prisoned ourselves." 16 The issue the Court may confront in coming
years is how we can modify-abolition seems impractical-the exclusionary rule while reasonably protecting violations of individual liberty
and establishing laws conducive to actual punishment of illegal en17
forcement of the law.
William Gangi*

DFENDiNrG BusinEss AND WHITE CoLLARu CRr~s. By F. Lee Bailey &

Henry B. Rothblatt, New York, New York: Lawyers Co-Operative
Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 740.
What two famous criminal trial lawyers have a habit of striking
fear in the hearts of prosecutors? Why, F. Lee Bailey and Henry B.
Rothblatt, of course." They do it in the courtroom and they do it when
they team up to write a book for the benefit of their fellow trial lawyers.
Their book, Defending Business and White Collar Crimes, has brought
insight and confidence to the defense bar.
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 n.52 (1966).
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); isenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219 (1941).
15 CLR, supra note 1, at 277; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
16 Id. at 267; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 448, 493 (1971).
17 Id. at 275; Biven v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(Chief Justice Burger dissenting).
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, St. John's University. Ph.D., University of Notre Dame.
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